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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
CHARLES E. RICHMOND, Executor of 
the Estate of WILLIAM B. OUTCALT, 
Deceased, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
IVIE W. BALLARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I 
t Case No. 
1 8755 
l 
I 
BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As a reply to the respondent's Petition for Rehearing, we 
set forth herein a concise answer to the points raised. A more 
complete answer may be found in the appellant's Brief here-
tofore filed and in the opinion of this court. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
MRS. BALLARD'S TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO 
EXECUTION OF THE DEED IS COMPETENT. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD COMPELS THE 
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THIS COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT REFLECTS ONLY 
THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSIONS COMPELLED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV. 
NEITHER WIGMORE NOR ANY OTHER AUTHOR-
ITY WOULD ADMIT EXHIBIT 11. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
I\!RS. BALLARD'S TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO 
EXECUTION OF THE DEED IS COMPETENT. 
Counsel for respondent admit that Mrs. Ballard's testimony 
,., as properly received yet they complain because the court has 
given credence to it. At page 4 of respondent's petition it is 
stated: 
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.~[ 
~: 
"The trial court properly admitted and heard ~11 the 
evidence on both sides of the case." 
Counsel's position is a paradox. On the one hand they 
state the testimony was properly received and on the other 
hand it is urged that it is not entitled to consideration. Plain-
tiff agrees that he waived the incompetency of Mrs. Ballard 
to testify with regard to circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion of the deed. He is certainly in no position, and we do not 
understand him to argue, that the incompetent exhibit proffered 
by him and received by the court did not effect a waiver. The 
offer and admission of evidence, whether competent or not, 
which it is claimed relates to a privileged transaction consti-
tutes a waiver of the statute, just as would a failure to object. 
Anderson v. Anderson, 136 Wis. 328, 117 N.W. 807. 
There was a waiver of the statute by the offer and admis-
sion of Exhibit 11. There was also a waiver by plaintiff's 
examination of Mrs. Ballard as an adverse witness. Respond-
ent's counsel by their questioning of Mrs. Ballard elicited part 
of the contract made between Mrs. Ballard and the deceased 
(R. 183-185). This opened the door to proof as to modification 
of said contract by execution of the deed. Whether the waiver 
was effected by Exhibit 11 or by the examination of Mrs. 
Ballard or by both is of little consequence, ho·wever. There 
being a waiver of her disqualification, her testimony is entitled 
to the same credence as that of other witnesses. It is an estab-
lished principle of law that: 
"Where there is a waiver of the incompetency of the 
witness to testify as to transactions or communications 
with decedent, such testimony has probative force, 
cannot be disregarded, requires no corroboration before 
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it can be credited, and is to be weighed as other testi-
mony." 97 C.J.S. 737. 
See also Boeltcher v. Busse, 45 Wash. 2d 579, 277 
P. 2d 368; Farias v. Salas, 244 S. W. 1115; In re Schae-
fer's Estate, 261 Wis. 431, 53 N.W. 2d 427. 
But suppose that there had been no waiver and that Mrs. 
Ballard was therefore disqualified from testifying as to the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed. How 
would this affect the evidence? Respondent has not alleged 
nor has he introduced a scintilla of evidence to prove that 
the deed was not executed and delivered by Outcalt. The 
genuineness of the document is unchallenged. Further, there 
is not only a total failure of proof of undue influence, but 
the independent testimony of several impartial witnesses, as 
pointed out by the court, conclusively refute that allegation. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD COMPELS THE 
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THIS COURT. 
Point 2 of respondent's Petition for Rehearing begins 
with the following sentence: 
"The trial court did not belieYe Mrs. Ballard's ver-
sion of the manner in which the deed was obtained, 
and there is ample reason for such determination." 
Although counsel state there is "ample reason" for disbelieving 
l\1rs. Ballard's account of the execution of the deed, they have 
not ch~..)sen to state to this court one single reason in support 
nf this bro~td claim. Instead of bolstering their own case, they 
have attempted to select, isolate and discredit portions of the 
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opinion of this court. The fact that one and one-half pages 
of the petition are devoted to a vain attempt to show that the 
court erred in hinting at the intent and motives of the Rich-
monds demonstrates the complete inability of counsel to point 
to evidence in support of the trial court's judgment. 
Counsel complain bitterly because some weight has been 
given to the December codicil as reflecting the agreement of 
Outcalt to leave his property to the defendant. This agreement 
was not only established by testimony elicited by plaintiffs 
counsel themselves but Outcalt's intentions were clearly estab-
lished by the independent testimony of his neighbors, the 
Taylors (R. 200-202, 250-259). Plaintiff's petition does not 
tell us why the court should ignore the December codicil and 
the events leading up to it. The court gave credence to this 
evidence because it was established as factual without dispute 
and by the uncontradicted testimony of several witnesses. 
It is urged by respondent that the court should be suspicious 
because Outcalt did not tell the world that he had given Mrs. 
Ballard a deed. This feeble attempt to cast doubt on the execu-
tion of the deed is completely obliterated by the undisputed 
fact that Outcalt did not choose to disclose to the Richmonds 
and the McConnells either the contract, the December codicil 
or the olographic will. Why should his private affairs be as an 
open book to these people? 
The opinion of this court reflects a painstaking review 
of the record and a careful analysis of the facts. Plaintiff's 
counsel have failed to point to a single sentence in the fifteen 
page opinion which indicates a departure from or a distortion 
of the evidence as contained in the record, nor have they sug-
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gested any pertinent evidence which has not been fully 
considered and dealt with. 
POINT III. 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT REFLECTS ONLY 
THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSIONS COMPELLED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Irrespective of the regard which Dr. Marshall and Mrs. 
Romney had for Mr. Outcalt, it is simply inescapable from the 
undisputed evidence th.at he double-crossed Mrs. Ballard. 
Counsel have not attempted nor are they able from the record 
to show that the execution of the olographic will was anything 
but an unmitigated act of deceit. Likewise the preparation of 
Exhibit 11 is susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation. 
It is unfortunate that the evidence which indicates the character 
of the acts performed by the decedent must be published for 
all the world to read but this cannot be laid at the door of 
the court or of the defendant for it was the choice of plaintiff 
and his counsel to exact the last pound of flesh in attempting 
to deprive Mrs. Ballard of the fruits of her labor. 
Respondent's counsel have lost track of the fact that it is 
this court's prerogative and duty to weigh the evidence in 
the rccorJ in order to determine where the preponderance lies. 
It is urged again and again that there was opportunity and 
reason for suspicion, ~·et there is no evidence either direct or 
cirL'umstantial tending to prove the exercise of undue influence. 
railing in their proof to show undue influence counsel argue 
that it must be presumed that Mrs. Ballard exercised undue 
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influence because she was Outcalt's housekeeper. In support 
of this proposition the case of Omega Investment Company v. 
Woolley is cited. Counsel fail to mention that the relationship 
of attorney-client was involved in that case. Their argument 
on presumptions is completely answered by the green sheet 
opinion of the court and by the authorities cited at pages 51 
to 54 of the Brief of Appellant. In any event this could not 
be controlling for the defendant's evidence was more than 
ample to eliminate the effect of any presumption and by no 
stretch of the imagination could it be said that plaintiff's 
evidence was "clear and convincing." 
POINT IV. 
NEITHER WIGMORE NOR ANY OTHER AUTHOR-
ITY WOULD ADMIT EXHIBIT 11. 
The opinion of this court holds Exhibit 11 incompetent 
for multiple reasons. Namely, ( 1) it is irrelevant, ( 2) it 
violates the opinion rule, and ( 3) it is self-serving and hearsay. 
Referring to the exhibit the green sheet opinion states: 
" . . . It does not purport to relate to the deed or 
any deed. It does not say that any paper was signed 
under undue pressure. It does not refer to any specific 
transaction, it does not specify or refer to any definite 
time, place, circumstance or person. It has no probative 
value in proving the fact of undue influence, unless we 
use it, in violation of the Hearsay rule to show the 
ultimate fact that other papers may have been signed 
by him and we guess and single out the deed, Exhibit 
1, as one of the papers he had in mind, if he had any 
in mind." 
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The Petition for Rehearing completely ignores the fact 
that the exhibit is irrelevant and in violation of the opinion 
rule. No attempt has been made either in respondent's Brief 
or in the Petition for Rehearing to justify admission of the 
exhibit in view of these rules of evidence. Instead counsel 
urges that the exhibit is not hearsay and for that reason should 
be held admissible and given weight. This, of course, is in 
utter disregard of the careful consideration given by this court 
to the several objections made to admission of the exhibit. 
But it is clear that the exhibit is just as squarely opposed to 
the hearsay rule as it is to the other mentioned rules. 
The portion of Wigmore's text quoted by the court fully 
sustains the proposition that Exhibit 11 is hearsay for the 
purpose for which respondent's counsel offered it. Notwith-
standing the fact that the exhibit was signed more than two 
months subsequent to the execution of the deed, counsel now 
contend that the exhibit is competent to show the deceased's 
mental condition. Their argument, however, fails to consider 
the inescapable conclusions reached by this court and reflected 
in the following language of the opinion: 
"Decedent's declaration in Exhibit 11 has no rele-
vancy to the issues unless his declaration is true. As 
so considered it strikes squarely at the hearsay rule 
. . . The letter does not disclose the grantor's state 
of mind as to the grantee .... He is not disclosing 
his mental attitude toward her. Conceded that a state-
ment, oral or in a letter, made by decedent at a time 
not too remote that reflected his mental attitude toward 
the grantee or evidenced his view of her intent is ad-
missible .... Statements of the grantor tending to show 
that his mind could be easily influenced and that an-
other person dominated him or attempted to dominate 
10 
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him are, under proper conditions, admissible for the 
purpose of showing the condition of his mind at the 
time he made the statement, but the naked statement 
of a conclusion that grantor was 'unduly pressured' 
is inadmissible because it goes solely to prove the ulti-
mate fact, and, does not go to the condition of the 
grantor's mind at the time of utterance.'' 
In addition to being an irrelevant, self-serving hearsay 
conclusion of the decedent, the exhibit is squarely opposed to 
the criteria for admissibility set forth in the Mower case. 
Although counsel contend that these criteria go to the weight 
of the evidence only, it is clear from a careful reading of the 
decision that unless the declarations are made fairly and in 
the ordinary course of life and not in apparent anticipation of 
litigation, they should not be admitted. 
CONCLUSION 
The court has committed no error in its application of the 
law to the facts. The decision reflects the fair and equitable 
result which the facts of the case require. The Petition for 
Rehearing is merely a re-hash of issues already correctly 
decided by this court in its painstaking review of the record. 
\vie respectfully submit that the Petition for Rehearing should 
be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
GRANT .MACFARLANE, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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